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ABSTRACT
This article draws on the public testimonies of North Koreans living
in South Korea (t’albungmin) and analyzes the role that these
narratives play in South Korean society as mechanisms of
inclusion and exclusion. North and South Korea technically remain
at war, with South Korea claiming sovereignty over the entire
Korean peninsula. While t’albungmin are eligible for South Korean
citizenship, they describe feeling excluded from full social
membership. Although some t’albungmin seek anonymity, this
paper considers those who gain social status by speaking publicly
about their lives and denouncing the North Korean regime. In so
doing, they distance themselves from North Korea and align
themselves with the “good” discourse of human rights. However,
their actions reinforce a logic of exclusion, implying that
t’albungmin who prefer anonymity are “sympathizers” of the North
and consequently restricting their access to social benefits and
resources. This case of conditional inclusion illuminates tensions
that arise when a sovereignty claim entails the incorporation of
people from an enemy state. It also highlights the carefully
delineated boundaries of publicly acceptable behavior within
which “suspect” citizens must remain as a condition for positive
recognition.
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Introduction
In October 2014, a young woman named Park Yeonmi1 stood in front of the One Young
World Summit in Dublin, Ireland to offer testimony of her life in North Korea.2 Wearing a
traditional Korean dress and fighting back tears, Park spoke of her childhood under dic-
tatorship, her family’s harrowing escape to China, and her arrival in South Korea. “North
Koreans are desperately seeking and dying for freedom,” she explained. Park’s speech was
impassioned, compelling, and struck a chord with the audience. It has since been viewed
online over eighty-two million times.3
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1In this article we follow the convention of writing Korean names surname first.
2Throughout this article, we refer to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) as North Korea, and the Republic of
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3One Young World 2014, 2017.
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In this article, we consider the experiences of a group of people we refer to as t’albung-
min4 –North Koreans living in South Korea who left their country following a nationwide
famine in the 1990s and migrated through China to South Korea.5 In particular, we draw
on the public narratives of t’albungmin, including testimonies of those like Park who
address international audiences or speak on national and local platforms. We argue
that these public narratives illuminate certain conditions which North Koreans more
broadly must meet to gain acceptance in South Korean society.6
We explore the performative dimension of the politics of belonging.7 We specifically
focus on the role that the performance of public narratives plays in mediating access to
resources and status, drawing attention to the contingent nature of belonging, particularly
for naturalized citizens. While naturalization in certain countries requires prospective citi-
zens to prove they are earning above a certain wage (e.g. Austria, Germany, and the United
Kingdom),8 the case of North Koreans in South Korea highlights how naturalization can
also require displays of conformity, which may be political, religious, or ethnic, and can
change depending on the political climate. In such cases, consequences for non-confor-
mity can range from imprisonment in internment camps (for Japanese Americans
during World War II and Uyghurs in modern-day China), to governments revoking citi-
zenship (such as for British citizens suspected of affiliation with the Islamic State of Iraq
and the Levant, ISIS), to surveillance, discrimination, and marginalization.
We draw on ethnographic fieldwork carried out between 2010 and 2019, comprising
semi-structured interviews and focus group sessions with t’albungmin living in Seoul, as
well as participant observation in schools, churches, and non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) that work with t’albungmin. During our respective fieldwork periods, we used
qualitative methods to understand the everyday, lived experiences of North Koreans
who had settled in South Korea.9 The majority of the t’albungmin we interacted with
were concerned about protecting their privacy and security. Why, then, do a small min-
ority of t’albungmin choose to publicly identify themselves as North Korean, whether
4There are numerous Korean-language designations used to refer to North Koreans in South Korea, including their official
title, Pukhan it’al chumin (“residents who have escaped North Korea”), and the commonly-used terms saet’ŏmin (“new
settler”) and t’albukcha (“North Korean escapee/defector”). None of these labels enjoys wholehearted support among
North Koreans in South Korea, who strongly oppose any implication that they have abandoned or betrayed their
country, or that they are simply migrants to be treated on a par with non-Korean resident foreigners. As a result,
there remains no consensus on how to refer to them. In this article we primarily refer to them as “North Koreans in
South Korea” or t’albungmin – a relatively neutral term that many use to refer to themselves, which distinguishes
them from North Koreans more generally (including those who live in North Korea).
5For more on the North Korean famine see Haggard and Noland 2007.
6We wish to make clear that we are encouraging critique of a system that utilizes North Koreans for various purposes, and
our criticism is not of individual t’albungmin. On the contrary, both authors owe a significant debt to the many t’albung-
min who have facilitated and supported their research over the years.
7Bell 1999; Butler 1990; Yuval-Davis 2006.
8Stadlmair 2018.
9Jennifer Hough conducted three years of ethnographic fieldwork between 2013 and 2015 and between 2018 and 2019
with t’albungmin living in Seoul. During this time, she interacted with over 120 t’albungmin primarily aged between eigh-
teen and forty, who had arrived in South Korea between 1991 and 2014. She conducted thirty-two in-depth, semi-struc-
tured interviews and carried out participant observation in a wide variety of locations, including five primary field sites,
comprising two alternative schools catering to t’albungmin, two t’albungmin university student groups, and at a weekly
t’albungmin football training session. Markus Bell carried out two years of ethnographic fieldwork between 2010 and
2012, supplemented by annual follow-up visits, including a further three months in 2013 and 2014. His research primarily
involved volunteering with three NGOs and two churches that work with t’albungmin. He attended meetings, taught
English, translated documents from Korean to English, and acted as the media spokesperson for one of the groups.
He also lived with a young t’albungmin man for a year, participated in the various groups of which he was a
member, and contributed his skills whenever required.
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on an international stage, in the South Korean national media, or at local events organized
by NGOs and churches? What might incentivize such behavior, given how frequently t’al-
bungmin voiced to us their concerns about anti-North Korean discrimination in South
Korea, and what compromises does such a decision entail?
The contingent nature of belonging
Over 33,000 North Koreans have arrived in South Korea since 1953, more than seventy
percent of whom have been women, with the annual number of arrivals peaking in
2009.10 Although relations between North and South Korea remain tense, the South
Korean government welcomes North Koreans who successfully reach the South,
offering them citizenship on the condition that they undergo intensive investigation
and are not deemed a threat to national security. However, despite being naturalized
South Korean citizens, t’albungmin often speak of feeling marginalized in their new home.
While naturalized citizens in general may face pressure to conform, the need to
demonstrate alignment with the majority group can be stronger for people whose
right to belong is questioned on other grounds, including members of “suspect commu-
nities.”11 First used to describe mainland Britain’s treatment of Irish residents during the
1968 to 1998 period of sectarian violence in Northern Ireland known as “the Troubles,”
the term “suspect community” targets other minority communities, such as Muslims in
the United States since 9/11. One effect of this treatment is a perceived need for
members of these groups to conspicuously demonstrate their commitment to the
values of the dominant group through particular forms of political performance, or
risk being viewed with suspicion. In other words, “good Muslims” are expected to
vocally condemn violence and terrorism, and are held responsible for preventing the
radicalization of others.12 What is unusual about the Korean case, however, is that
North Koreans in South Korea are treated as members of a suspect community while
enjoying certain privileges, such as legal equality and access to financial resettlement
packages, as ethnic return migrants.
Ethnic return migrants are often granted extended rights compared to non-ethnic
foreigners, particularly in countries which have historically emphasized an alleged homo-
geneous ethnic identity, such as Greece, Japan, and South Korea.13 Yet, even countries that
ostensibly welcome co-ethnic foreign nationals also draw legal and social distinctions
between the majority population and returning co-ethnics, whether formally with differ-
entiated citizenship rights or informally through discrimination. Such tiered structures of
belonging within a national community are notably dynamic. Within a vertical system of
belonging, the positioning of immigrant co-ethnics is dependent on both geopolitical and
domestic considerations at any given time.14 Co-ethnic returnees might be assigned a sub-
altern position that reflects both imaginaries of the country from which they arrived, as
well as the perceived cultural distance that members of the majority society imagine
between themselves and the new arrivals.
10Ministry of Unification 2019a.
11Hillyard 1993.
12Breen-Smyth 2014, 237.
13Seol and Skrentny 2009; Shipper 2010; Triandafyllidou and Veikou 2002; Tsuda 2003.
14Seol and Skrentny 2009.
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For example, ethnic Japanese return migrants from Brazil (nikkeijin) have encountered
a mismatch between their own behavioral expectations and those of Japanese society.
Upon their arrival in Japan, from the late 1980s onwards, many nikkeijin experienced a
sense of disappointment when not welcomed by local Japanese, who in turn were sur-
prised at how different the newcomers were, in spite of their shared ethnic and cultural
heritage. In this case, feelings of rejection prompted ethnic returnees to resist pressures
to assimilate by performing a hybrid Japanese-Brazilian identity, or an “ethnic counter-
identity.”15 Such performances included conspicuous displays of Brazilian music and
dance.
Ethnic Koreans from China (chosŏnjok) who have migrated to South Korea to fill low-
skilled jobs have voiced similar feelings of alienation. Much like returning nikkeijin, cho-
sŏnjok labor migrants’ initially positive perceptions of their host society have soured as a
result of a growing feeling that they are discriminated against, and that their economic
value to their new country is more important than ethnic kinship. Consequently, chosŏn-
joks’ sense of a shared ethnic identity has given way to an ethnic nationalism that embraces
a Chinese, rather than Korean, identity.16
However, unlike nikkeijin or chosŏnjok, t’albungmin who face discrimination have
limited recourse to cultural practices from their region of birth, in a South Korean
context where North Korean identity markers often attract unwanted attention. Indeed,
many of our t’albungmin interlocutors felt a need to completely hide their identities,
fearful of discrimination resulting from seventy years of hostility between the two
Koreas. Interlocutors spoke of practicing a Seoul accent after their arrival in the South,
most commonly by repeating phrases aloud as they watched television, including imitating
the phrasing and intonation of news broadcasters in the privacy of their own homes.17 But
maintaining such a façade can exact a toll on the mental health of new arrivals.
Resettlement in South Korea is experienced differently according to the age, gender,
education level, and skill set of an individual. Nonetheless, ease of resettlement is
affected by depression and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), which are highly preva-
lent among t’albungmin.18 Newly arrived t’albungmin can find everyday life in South
Korea challenging, as they need to learn how to manage finances, develop social networks,
and survive in a technologically advanced, consumer-capitalist society. Despite being nat-
uralized South Korean citizens, our interlocutors spoke of feeling excluded from South
Korean society. “When South Koreans hear North Korea, they don’t think of me as a
Korean person,” said one twenty-three year-old female interlocutor, who had arrived
from North Korea less than a year before. “Many South Koreans are good-hearted people
… [but] what I’ve slowly noticed is that I feel slightly ignored. They tend to look down on
us as inferior to them and naturally feel sorry for us.”
Further, upon arrival in South Korea, many t’albungmin lack recognized credentials or
skills and struggle to find employment.19 In spite of policies designed to facilitate their
integration into the South Korean economy, the unemployment rate among t’albungmin
15Tsuda 2000, 56; Tsuda 2003.
16Freeman 2011; Song 2009, 282–283.
17For those with some degree of confidence in their South Korean manner of speaking, a common strategy is to claim to be
from the southeastern Kyŏngsang region of South Korea.
18Lee, Lee, and Park 2017.
19Most t’albungmin work in low-skilled and service sector jobs. As of 2018, 22.5 percent were employed as laborers, 18.1
percent as service workers, and 11.7 percent as industrial assembly workers. See Korea Hana Foundation 2019, 123.
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has fallen only slightly over the last decade and remains higher than the South Korean
average: as of 2018, 6.9 percent of t’albungmin were unemployed,20 compared to four
percent of the general South Korean population.21 Between 2008 and 2018, the pro-
portion of t’albungmin receiving income support declined from 54.8 percent to 24.4
percent,22 yet remains significantly higher than the 3.2 percent of South Koreans who
rely on state benefits.23 Moreover, 62.7 percent of t’albungmin live in state housing
issued to them upon arrival,24 while only seven percent of South Korea-born citizens
reside in such accommodation.25 Although the situation is improving, by these
measures many t’albungmin are second-class citizens – living among, but not equal
to, South Koreans.26
Yet, not all t’albungmin struggle to survive in South Korea, and a small proportion,
including Park, have gained comparatively high profiles and improved social status as a
result of speaking publicly about their lives in North Korea. Although North Koreans con-
tinue to reach South Korea, the rate at which they arrive has slowed since 2011.27 However,
during the same period the North Korean diaspora has become more visible, as growing
international criticism of human rights violations within North Korea has presented more
opportunities for t’albungmin to speak about conditions inside the DPRK. Many of the
t’albungmin who appear at international events and forums around the world first
become public figures in South Korea.
A desire to improve one’s position vis-à-vis co-ethnics in a hierarchical system suggests
a key motivation for public performative acts that reproduce dominant discourses and
signal allegiance to the majority group, particularly when these performances are a
means of acquiring social capital. In this case, public narratives by t’albungmin are a mech-
anism to potentially position themselves higher in a system of “hierarchical nationhood.”28
In contrast to co-ethnics such as nikkeijin or chosŏnjok who have responded to their mar-
ginalization by more closely adopting identity practices associated with their country of
birth, the public narratives of t’albungmin align with South Korean renderings of North
Korea as a wholly negative place, while also offering speakers a means of acquiring
improved social status.
In the sections that follow we consider the kinds of public performances that t’albung-
min are invited to give, the content they discuss, and the reward structure surrounding
these performances. We suggest that the decision by an individual to publicly identify
as North Korean marks their entry into a space in which inclusion and exclusion are
20Ministry of Unification 2019a. The t’albungmin unemployment rate in 2008 was 9.5 percent.
21Ministry of Unification 2019b, 11.
22Ministry of Unification 2019a.
23Statistics Korea 2018.
24Korea Hana Foundation 2019, 92.
25Pong and Choi 2019, 22.
26A growing volume of scholarship discusses how t’albungmin respond to these forms of exclusion, including re-migrating
from South Korea to third countries. See for example Jung, Dalton, and Willis 2017; Kim and Jang 2007; Song and Bell
2018; Watson 2015; and Yoon 2001.
27Fewer than ten North Koreans defected to South Korea annually before 1994, at which point famine was driving North
Koreans to leave the country in large numbers in search of food and work. Approximately 1,350 North Koreans arrived in
South Korea between 1994 and 2001, since which time the number arriving annually has consistently exceeded 1,000,
with more than 2,000 North Koreans arriving each year between 2006 and 2011. Numbers peaked in 2009 with 2,914
arrivals, before a significant drop to 1,502 in 2012. Since this time the number of arrivals has remained relatively con-
sistent. This has been connected to the stricter border controls which accompanied the change of leadership in North
Korea in December 2011. See Ministry of Unification 2019a.
28Seol and Skrentny 2009.
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negotiated. In the process, we seek to identify the characteristics and underlying logic of
the conditions structuring their inclusion into public spaces. We argue that, by and large,
these structural, normative, and institutional conditions allow for only a conditional
inclusion of t’albungmin in South Korea. Denouncing North Korea’s human rights
abuses performs the dual function of highlighting both personal distance from the
North Korean state and alignment with the “good” discourse of human rights. By repro-
ducing particular discourses as a condition of acceptance, t’albungmin may gain in social
status as a result of direct payments, educational opportunities, or social prestige.
However, their actions reinforce the logic of exclusion, restricting access to these
benefits to those t’albungmin who perpetuate these specific narratives. Further, by self-
identifying as good citizens, they reinforce the binary logic that stigmatizes t’albungmin
who fail to do so as potential North Korea sympathizers, thus making it harder for
members of this latter group to successfully integrate into South Korean society.
Sites of negotiation
For the majority of t’albungmin, their arrival in the South marks the end of a period of
extreme precarity. Most leave North Korea overland via China, during which time they
live in hiding, avoiding Chinese state security services and relying on networks of predo-
minantly Christian religious groups, secular non-governmental activists, and people
smugglers.29 Arrival in South Korea is the beginning of a different set of challenges, as
new arrivals must learn and then navigate the demands of the host society. One such
demand is a desire for information; t’albungmin are not only required to verify their iden-
tities by providing South Korean state representatives with detailed life histories, they also
find themselves invited by human rights organizations, religious groups, and popular
media outlets to speak about life in North Korea.
The first years that a t’albungmin spends in South Korea are characterized by a power
dynamic evident in their relationships with both state officials and non-state actors.
According to our interlocutors, t’albungmin are interrogated by the National Intelligence
Service upon arrival in the country, during which time they are required to write about
their life histories and journeys out of the country – both as a means of gaining infor-
mation about North Korea and to confirm their identities. This is followed by a twelve-
week “re-education” program in the state facility known as Hanawon (“House of
Unity”), during which time t’albungmin are equipped with practical skills, provided
with medical support, and taught subjects including South Korean history and
English.30 Only at this point may they leave custodial care and enter South Korean
society, aided by a resettlement benefit of up to seven million won (approximately USD
$6,000), access to vocational and educational support, and a “protection officer.”31
Regular meetings with state representatives, including social workers and healthcare pro-
fessionals, provides the government both a means of monitoring new arrivals and an
avenue through which to offer support and advice during the initial years of resettlement.
State surveillance and institutional re-education is ostensibly designed to protect national
29Bell 2016; Han 2013; Jung 2011.
30Ministry of Unification 2018, 22–24.
31Ministry of Unification 2018, 15–16.
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security and promote assimilation into South Korean society, balancing the twin goals of
monitoring and protection.
The hierarchical dynamic between t’albungmin and South Korean state representatives
is mirrored in their relationships with the civic organizations that support their resettle-
ment in South Korea. These same human rights and Christian organizations often
move North Koreans out of China, resulting in relationships of heightened obligation.
Christian organizations such as the Manmin Church, Yaksu Church, and SaRang Presby-
terian Church pay t’albungmin monthly stipends of up to 200,000 won (approximately
USD$170) to attend services and demonstrate their commitment to God.32 The manifes-
tation of their commitment often takes the form of a ritualistic religious conversion nar-
rative, publicly detailing their divine (i.e. Protestant Christian) journey from damnation to
salvation and verbalizing their gratitude to demonstrate their sincerity.33 Secular groups in
Seoul also pay new arrivals. For example, during our fieldwork we witnessed leaders of
Young Han Woori, a social group for both North and South Koreans, present North
Korean members with monthly “pocket money” (yongdon). One of the organization’s
leaders, Ahn Seo-jin, explained that stipends were an incentive for high school and uni-
versity-age t’albungmin to work hard at their studies.
When a North Korean arrives in South Korea, their understanding and subsequent
use of public space becomes central to their ability to manage their “North Korean-
ness,” performing aspects of their ethnic and cultural identity on demand, while
hiding it from public view at other times. Given the hierarchical relationship
between t’albungmin and a South Korean public that includes both state bureaucrats
and civil society actors such as medical professionals, the media, religious groups,
and NGOs, these public performances subject t’albungmin to a disciplinary “gaze,”34
entailing an extension of formal systems of surveillance that result in the internalization
and subsequent self-regulation of their behavior. While giving many South Koreans
their first glimpse of someone from North Korea, these occasions also encourage north-
ern-born participants to craft a performance of North Koreanness that is agreeable to
South Korean audiences.
Popular television programs are one prominent site where the South Korean public is
encouraged to encounter t’albungmin. These include the panel shows “Now onMyWay to
Meet You” (Ije Mannarŏ Kamnida, abbreviated to Iman’gap) and “Moranbong Club”
(Moranbong K’ŭllŏp), and the reality show “Love Unification! Southern Man, Northern
Woman” (Aejŏng T’ongil! Namnam Bungnyŏ).35 These programs predominantly feature
North Korean women and South Korean male hosts, reflecting the gender disparity
among t’albungmin. They offer viewers a window into the lives of the aesthetically pleas-
ing, young t’albungmin they feature, supposedly bridging the gap between North and
South Koreans by emphasizing elements of shared culture. However, the editing and con-
versational tone on these shows present a domestic audience with representations of North
Koreans that reinforce difference, emphasizing particularly tragic, attention-grabbing
elements of their stories, dire conditions in the North, and a need for North Koreans to
32Power 2016.
33Jung 2015.
34Foucault 1995, 2003.
35Park Yeonmi first gained national prominence as a contestant on Iman’gap. She was also a regular speaker at events in
Seoul organized by the group Teach North Korean Refugees (TNKR), before later attracting international attention.
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be taught how to live in South Korea.36 These representations suggest that South Koreans
extend protection to their northern-born pupils, whom they consider to lack full decision-
making capacity, but at the expense of their independence.37 The performances of t’al-
bungmin on these programs are inflected with gendered and political characteristics
designed to confirm viewers’ preconceptions of the DPRK as a backward, failed socialist
state.38
The public performances of t’albungmin on international stages present a similarly
singular narrative, whether at explicitly political events – such as human rights forums,
commissions of inquiry, or the One Young World Summit where Park Yeonmi spoke
in 2014 – or at popular events such as TED talks. Lee Hyeonseo’s 2013 TED talk on
her escape from North Korea has received over eleven million views.39 Four months
later, Joseph Kim gave a TED talk on his experiences of famine in North Korea.40
These individuals have since contributed to the growing genre of harrowing biographies
on life and escape from North Korea, with titles including The Aquariums of Pyongyang:
Ten Years in the North Korean Gulag,41 Escape from Camp 14: One Man’s Remarkable
Odyssey from North Korea to Freedom in the West,42 Under the Same Sky: From Starvation
in North Korea to Salvation in America,43 and In Order to Live: A North Korean Girl’s
Journey to Freedom.44 The titles of these texts illustrate the overarching themes of the
public narratives that t’albungmin are invited to perform to audiences, both local and
global.45 They reinforce a hegemonic discourse that reduces North Korea and its people
to a monolithic touchstone of suffering and creates a simplistic, singular narrative that
is both digestible and agreeable to the disciplinary gaze of domestic and international audi-
ences. T’albungmin who accept such opportunities are offered a public platform but are
restricted in the topics they can discuss. These predominantly humanitarian narratives
perpetuate a “chain of exclusion,”46 effectively suppressing a diversity of t’albungmin
voices in the process.
The benefits of public status
T’albungmin are not blind to the reductive images with which they are associated and
voice their frustration about victimized representations promoted by television shows
such as Iman’gap and reinforced by images used in humanitarian campaigns.47 Many t’al-
bungmin we met emphasized that Iman’gap was an entertainment show, offering sensatio-
nalized rather than reliable information about North Korea. They urged us not to trust
36Epstein and Green 2013.
37Schiocchet 2017, 12.
38Cho 2018, 27.
39TED 2013a.
40TED 2013b.
41Kang and Rigoulot 2001.
42Harden 2012.
43Kim and Talty 2015.
44Park and Vollers 2015.
45Our experiences working with and interviewing t’albungmin highlight that civic groups, the government, and the military
also offer them opportunities to give talks to the South Korean public. Meanwhile, international speaking opportunities
are offered by, for example, human rights-related events, political fundraisers, and corporate motivational training days.
46Bauman 2004, 77.
47Allen et al. 2018, 231–232; Oh 2013.
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what people said on the show, criticizing it for perpetuating a stereotype of all North
Koreans as poor, helpless victims. This raises the question of why t’albungmin participate
in public appearances which perpetuate this undesirable image. Moreover, given their
desire to protect their privacy and security, why would t’albungmin choose to publicly
identify as North Korean or appear on South Korean national television programs
watched by millions of viewers?
A key reason why some t’albungmin speak publicly is financial insecurity. Monetizing
one’s story is an opportunity to earn income – particularly given that almost a quarter of
North Koreans in South Korea rely on state welfare.48 Compounding their financial
difficulties, t’albungmin we interviewed told us that migrants routinely arrive in South
Korea in debt and often use early welfare payments to repay the brokers who facilitated
their journeys through China. A single appearance on a program like Iman’gap can be
worth hundreds of dollars, with t’albungmin who become popular on these shows
offered additional revenue-generating opportunities, such as contracts to write autobio-
graphies. Their “trauma stories” become symbolic capital that they can exchange for
material resources.49 Although not every t’albungmin successfully auditions for television,
NGO public speaking events are open to any Korean from the North and offer similar cash
rewards. The t’albungmin we met conceded that these benefits attracted them to attend
such events.
Teach North Korean Refugees (TNKR) is one such group. It runs regular English
speech contests, and in 2018 paid every finalist between 100,000 and one million won
(approximately USD$890).50 The group also holds “language matching sessions,” where
t’albungmin are paired with native English speakers who provide free English tuition,
which would otherwise cost upwards of 50,000 won (approximately USD$45) per
hour.51 Public speaking engagements of this kind offer the potential for t’albungmin to
earn much more than they would as a low-skilled employee, while further incentives
include the possibility of publishing contracts and educational support exceeding that
offered within the South Korean education system.
In addition to providing a source of income, these speaking opportunities offer t’al-
bungmin a chance to engage in strategic essentialism: accepting the premise of promi-
nent mainstream discourse as a means of accessing a public platform which allows them
to counter and humanize the narrative with their own stories, albeit on a circumscribed
range of topics. The online talks of Park Yeonmi, Lee Hyeonseo and Joseph Kim, for
48Ministry of Unification 2019a.
49Kleinman and Kleinman 1996, 10.
50TNKR 2017, 2018.
51The case of TNKR raises an interesting question about supply and demand, given the organization’s activities and sources
of funding. Since 2015 TNKR has been financially supported by the Atlas Network, an American libertarian organization
that promotes free-market principles and limited government intervention (Atlas Network 2014a, 2015b). Atlas Network
think tanks throughout the world receive funding from the U.S. State Department and the U.S. government-funded
National Endowment for Democracy (Fang 2017). The language training that TNKR offers North Koreans includes a
specialist stream dedicated to public speaking, and all English-speaking volunteers applying to coach t’albungmin are
expected to help them prepare at least two public speeches. TNKR’s ninth English speech contest in February 2019
invited contestants to prepare a ten-minute speech on the topic of “My TED talk about North Korea,” with TNKR prom-
ising the paying audience “moving” speeches which would “open your eyes to the struggles, experiences and challenges
facing North Korean refugees” (TNKR 2019). TNKR co-founder Casey Lartigue campaigned for Lee Hyeonseo to be
included in TED, while two of TNKR’s self-appointed “special ambassadors,” Cherie Yang and Park Eunhee, have given
recent TEDx talks (TEDx 2017, 2019). One interpretation of TNKR practices is that the organization satisfies a demand
by training t’albungmin to present their stories; alternatively, it could itself be generating this demand.
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example, have received millions of views from around the world, indicating the degree
of public interest in their stories and the potential for them to garner social capital.
However, these opportunities also constrain what they are able to talk about. For
example, in return for receiving a scholarship from the Wooyang Foundation, one inter-
locutor was required to give presentations to South Korean schoolchildren on the topic of
unification, which he described as one of “many opportunities for this kind of unification
lecturing work.” He interpreted this as an invitation to talk about his personal experiences
in North Korea. We witnessed other interlocutors recounting similar stories when invited
to talk about peace, human rights, and intercultural exchange. On the documentary series
Unreported World, one female t’albungmin said, “In North Korea no one would listen to
me but here [in South Korea] people listen, and everyone is shocked.”52 Rather than nor-
malizing their past experiences and suffering, South Koreans potentially offer t’albungmin
sympathy in a forum that intensifies the emotional responses of both the audience and the
t’albungmin speaker. These examples show the role of media platforms in shaping the por-
trayal of t’albungmin, given the limited opportunities for a South Korean to meet a North
Korean in person.
It is not difficult to understand the appeal of opportunities that improve one’s socio-
economic position, despite the potential negative consequences. North Koreans in
South Korea are predominantly seen by South Koreans as low status, and they commonly
speak of experiencing discrimination in the form of underemployment, social exclusion,
and stigmatization.53 Like Korean-Chinese (chosŏnjok) migrant workers, t’albungmin
occupy an ambiguous position in South Korea: they are ethnic kin but also individuals
who lack financial and social capital. Perhaps most significantly, t’albungmin are represen-
tatives of an enemy state in a system of hierarchical nationhood, according to which geo-
political imaginaries are mapped onto the bodies of ethnic returnees. In such an
environment, particularly once an individual becomes cognizant of the unspoken social
hierarchy, it becomes difficult to conceive of one’s self as an equal member of society.
Speaking publicly about human rights potentially elevates a North Korean’s social
status through affiliation with a morally worthy cause, given the dominant conception
within discussions about North Korea of human rights as “an unqualified good.”54
Indeed, t’albungmin who speak publicly are now routinely referred to as human rights acti-
vists or advocates. As human rights activists, personal experiences that might formerly have
been considered shameful now serve as social currency, constituting the evidence upon
which claims of human rights violations are brought forward in prestigious arenas, such
as the United Nations. For example, the UN Commission of Inquiry into North Korean
human rights called more than eighty t’albungmin and experts to offer public testimony
in 2014.55 T’albungmin can draw international attention to injustices they have personally
faced, publicly highlighting the torture, forced disappearances, hard labor, and capital pun-
ishment committed by the North Korean regime. In the process, they emphasize their per-
sonal distance from the North Korean state. Moreover, in the current geopolitical context,
their calls for justice are in line with contemporaneous demands by members of the inter-
national community for North Korea to be held to account for crimes against humanity.
52Unreported World 2017.
53Kim and Jang 2007; Korea Hana Foundation 2019, 103; Yoon 2001.
54Hong 2013, 517.
55United Nations General Assembly 2014, 10.
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The hidden parameters of inclusion
Given the themes common to the public narratives of t’albungmin, we identify three
unspoken conditions structuring their inclusion into such public spaces: they must be
prepared to talk publicly about personal experiences, accept that they may be primarily
framed as victims, and publicly identify as North Korean.
The first condition is a willingness to talk – in public – about what often are trau-
matic, highly personal experiences. When t’albungmin are invited to talk about their
pasts, they are commonly asked how they escaped from the North and subsequently
reached South Korea. Most North Koreans leave the DPRK overland, via China. The
Chinese government does not recognize North Koreans as persons seeking asylum but
classifies them as economic migrants, and repatriates them if caught. North Koreans
are thus forced to cross China and claim asylum in a third country, typically Thailand.
Many journeys involve forced confinement and a constant fear of capture and repatria-
tion. Moreover, North Koreans are highly vulnerable as undocumented migrants, with
women at particular risk of rape, sexual assault, and being sold into human-trafficking
networks or forced into marriages with Chinese men.56 They are also expected to
speak about the trauma of their lives in the DPRK. Numerous t’albungmin have
spoken of public executions, widespread starvation, and extreme psychological control
in the North. They do so in TED talks, public speeches, and television appearances, as
well as at NGO and religious events.
These themes are unsurprising, given South Korean public curiosity about the DPRK
and the high rates of post-traumatic stress disorder reported in t’albungmin after arrival
in South Korea.57 However, these themes of persecution and trauma distort the general
image of all North Koreans, reducing the complexity of their experiences to a specific,
generic framing.58 T’albungmin must not only be willing to answer personal questions
in public forums, but also accept that their inclusion in public space as North Koreans
is primarily as victims. This perpetuates a social asymmetry by falsely promising accep-
tance while simultaneously preventing it.
When primarily framed as victims, the ways in which North Koreans demonstrate
agency is overlooked or ignored.59 Such depictions are evident in reports by NGOs
such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, and in legislation including
the North Korean Human Rights Acts of both South Korea and the United States.60
This framing also reinforces an overly simplistic binary distinction between North
Korean “perpetrators” (the North Korean state) and “victims” (ordinary North
Koreans, whose freedoms the state restricts). This fails to capture the complexities of
people’s behavior when placed in desperate situations, which Primo Levi, writing about
the Holocaust, has described as the “gray zone.”61 Conveying his guilt at having survived
Auschwitz and the moral compromises he needed to make to stay alive, Levi challenges
56For more on the trafficking of North Koreans who flee to China see the U.S. State Department’s Trafficking in Persons
Report 2019, 274–275.
57Jeon et al. 2005; Shin, Lee, and Park 2016.
58Schiocchet 2017.
59Choi 2014, 274, 277; Song 2013, 163.
60Amnesty International 2018, 226; Human Rights Watch 2002; Ministry of Unification 2016; United States House of Repre-
sentatives 2004.
61Levi 1988, 31.
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expectations of circumscribed behavior thought appropriate for a “victim.” These expec-
tations can silence trauma survivors who engage in morally compromising behavior. For
example, North Korean women who are trafficked risk being judged as immoral or
degraded, rather than as individuals deserving of sympathy and support.62 This distinction
is perpetuated in the Korean context by the initial security investigations that t’albungmin
face, which explicitly treat them as a threat to South Korea’s national security until proven
otherwise.
A further consequence of a framing that prioritizes victimhood is that it focuses atten-
tion on individual North Koreans and their journeys, drawing attention away from the
wider geopolitical implications of the situation. For example, the trauma North Koreans
suffer in China is attributable to their undocumented status, based on the Chinese govern-
ment’s definition and treatment of them as economic migrants rather than refugees.63 The
South Korean government is also directly implicated in this process. Despite claiming
sovereignty over the entire Korean peninsula, the South Korean government does not rou-
tinely offer North Koreans consular protection in China. This suggests that it prioritizes its
bilateral relationship with China over both its responsibilities to its purported citizens and
its international commitments as a signatory of the United Nations Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees (the 1951 Refugee Convention). South Korea’s contradictory pos-
ition also highlights the conditional inclusion of t’albungmin in South Korean society;
while the ROK Constitution designates them citizens, they must typically be on South
Korean soil and have successfully passed the state’s security investigation in order to
claim this right.
Finally, these policies also support American geopolitical interests, as evidenced by U.S.
foreign policy initiatives. These have focused on sustaining pressure on the North Korean
regime by promoting a particular image of the country through the use of human rights
narratives. U.S. aims have walked “the fine line between destabilization and democracy
promotion.”64 Recognizing and questioning the perceived neutrality of the “humanitarian
reason”65 predominantly framing the narratives of t’albungmin draws our attention to
underlying international power relations in this geopolitically sensitive area.
A third condition to inclusion into public space is a willingness to publicly identify as
North Korean. To access the potential benefits associated with public speaking opportu-
nities, t’albungmin must be willing to publicize their faces and potentially their names,
a decision which carries a risk of retribution against themselves and their families.
North Koreans have legitimate reasons to avoid publicity after they arrive in South
Korea. North Korea is suspected of involvement in assassination attempts on high-
profile defectors in South Korea and numerous cyber-attacks, including on South
Korean government institutions.66 In South Korea, t’albungmin also face potential
62Choi 2014, 274; Kempadoo 1998, 137.
63The 1961 Sino-North Korean Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty guarantees mutual support between the two
countries, including repatriating undocumented border-crossers.
64Song and Hong 2014, 43.
65Fassin 2011.
66North Korean agents in South Korea are believed to be responsible for the assassination of Kim family member Yi Han-
yong in 1997 and the attempted killings of former politician Hwang Jang-yop in 2009 and activist Park Sang-hak in 2011.
See Fifield 2017. North Korean hackers are suspected to have been responsible for a security breach on a computer at a
South Korean government-run resettlement center in December 2018. The attack resulted in the leaking of the personal
data of 997 t’albungmin. See BBC 2018.
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ostracism or discrimination when applying for work. Consequently, the majority avoid
publicly identifying as North Korean if at all possible, with some going so far as to
refuse to be photographed by friends. NGOs such as Liberty in North Korea (LINK)
and TNKR commonly pixelate the faces of t’albungmin in photographs.
The cases of Shin Dong-hyuk and Park Yeonmi highlight the implications of public
scrutiny, in addition to drawing attention to wider geopolitical considerations related to
North Koreans’ testimony. Shin Dong-hyuk came to prominence among t’albungmin
due to his particularly difficult circumstances, being born into and escaping from a
high-security North Korean prison camp. The subject of a 2012 biography, Shin attracted
further attention as a key witness in the United Nation’s 2013 Commission of Inquiry on
Human Rights in North Korea (COI). However, in November 2014, the North Korean
authorities released a video of Shin’s father contradicting parts of his testimony, and
Shin admitted misrepresenting elements of his past, including his claim to have been
solely detained in the infamous Camp 14.67 Shin has said he believes his father was
“coerced” into denouncing him.68
Park Yeonmi has also been accused of fabrications and inconsistencies. When she first
began to speak publicly, she described her privileged former life, but now details her
mother’s rape by a broker and food shortages so extreme that she resorted to eating
insects. When pressed, she has attributed these discrepancies to miscommunication and
mistranslations. In the wake of these controversies, fellow t’albungmin have criticized
both Park and Shin, accusing them of undermining the credibility of them all and weak-
ening the international campaign against the North Korean government for human rights
abuses.69 Speaking in 2015, one of our female interlocutors said, “She [Park] is very young
so she doesn’t know better, but she is lying about a lot of things in order to make money.
And when people realize she is lying, they won’t believe what other North Koreans say.”
Moreover, Park’s association with the American libertarian Atlas Network raises questions
about the motivations behind the particular narrative she now promotes.70
The testimonies of t’albungmin are difficult to verify for a number of reasons. These
include fact-checking challenges, the potential distorting effects of paying t’albungmin
to speak, the influence of possible fame or improved social status, and the difficulty of fol-
lowing up when speakers have used pseudonyms to mask their identities, for the reasons
noted above.71 Shin’s biographer Blaine Harden, and Michael Kirby, Chair of the COI and
former Justice of the High Court of Australia, have both emphasized that UN COI
members deemed his testimony credible and consistent with what other North Koreans
had told them, despite the inconsistencies.72 The physical scars that Shin has on his
body are also consistent with the torture he claims to have undergone while incarcerated
in a North Korean prison camp.73 Moreover, psychological trauma is consistently found to
67Kaech’ŏn internment camp, known as “Camp 14,” holds political prisoners and their relatives in the DPRK. It is located in
South P’yŏngan province.
68Harden 2015.
69Harden 2015; Jolley 2014.
70In addition to Park’s association with TNKR, the Atlas Network hosted Park in New York for public appearances and book-
signings in 2014, 2015, and 2018 (Atlas Network 2014b, 2018). In 2015 it also held speaking events with t’albungmin
Cherie Yang in Florida and North Carolina, as part of the William Sumner Event Series, focusing on promoting “organ-
izations that share its vision of a free society” (Atlas Network 2015a, 2015c).
71Song 2015.
72Harden 2015; Kirby 2018, 315.
73Harden 2015.
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impair memory, suggesting that the expectation that the narratives of t’albungmin be
coherent may be unrealistic, which is itself a legitimate problem.74 Nonetheless, the
links between North Korean defector-activists and external actors, together with Pyon-
gyang’s efforts to discredit Shin and the entire UN COI process, highlight the broader
influence that t’albungmin have as activists tied to transnational networks.75
Wider consequences of conditional inclusion
We have argued that the performance of public narratives is a means by which t’albung-
min in South Korea acquire social capital, which potentially allows them to elevate them-
selves above co-ethnic immigrants – including chosŏnjok and other t’albungmin – and
transcend their suspect status as arrivals from North Korea. In contrast to co-ethnics
migrating to, say, Germany or Japan, who conspicuously perform divergent identities
that reflect the sending society, we have shown how t’albungmin are encouraged to
respond to their marginalized status within a system of hierarchical nationhood in
South Korea by consciously adopting the political rhetoric of the ROK. We have high-
lighted, however, that while there are tangible benefits for individuals who reproduce
this rhetoric as a condition of acceptance, their actions have the unintended consequence
of reinforcing the logic of exclusion that stigmatizes t’albungmin who fail to self-identify as
“good citizens.” Consequently, it becomes harder for t’albungmin who do not reproduce
such rhetoric to successfully integrate into South Korean society.
In closing, we would like to highlight the wider implications of North Koreans’ position
in South Korea for other cases of conditional inclusion. First, understanding the conditions
underwhich t’albungmin are selectively included in SouthKorean society draws attention to
the mechanisms by which people are simultaneously excluded, with the excluded salient in
their absence.When social inclusion in South Korea requires that t’albungmin testify about
abuses in the North using the language of human rights, recognition becomes contingent
upon the presentation of narratives that emphasize redemption, gratitude, and condemna-
tion of theDPRK, while reassuring the audience of theirmoral superiority. The grateful t’al-
bungmin, in turn, ostensibly takes a step closer to social acceptance and the material and
financial benefits that membership within this community provides. However, these con-
ditions for inclusion also act as restrictions. T’albungmin who publicly condemn North
Korea reinforce the binary of inclusion and exclusion, effectively excluding t’albungmin
who refrain from speaking on such topics from being able to access potential benefits.
As a case in point, one interlocutor attended an English-speaking contest for t’albung-
min in early 2015, telling us he had done so out of curiosity. When we asked why he had
not entered the contest despite speaking English well, he said he did not want his photo-
graph appearing in the media nor did he wish to publicize the details of his life in North
Korea, both of which might risk his family’s safety. Had he entered the event and been
selected as a finalist, he would have received at least 100,000 won (USD$85) with the
chance to receive up to one million won (USD$850) for the first prize. Instead, he and
his friends worked in convenience stores and fast-food outlets for the minimum wage
74Johnsen and Asbjørnsen 2008.
75Song 2018.
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of 5,580 won per hour (approximately USD$4.50), to cover their living expenses and send
remittances to their families in North Korea.
When t’albungmin are offered public forums to speak but encouraged to recount mem-
ories that fit into a paradigmatic narrative of “human rights violations,” there is little
public space in which they can speak of experiences not reducible to a human rights fra-
mework. Taken as representatives of an enemy state and members of a suspect community
within South Korea, North Koreans’ belonging in the ROK is tenuous and contingent on
their ability to continuously prove themselves worthy. In private, t’albungmin we met
recounted positive memories of life in North Korea, recalling, for example, their favorite
meals, friends from school, sharing food with neighbors, festivals, and special occasions
during which families gathered together. Yet, they avoided publicly discussing such recol-
lections in an environment in which they were already keenly aware of their lowly social
status, and where doing so could potentially jeopardize their chances of improving this.
“There are many good things in North Korean culture,” said one female interlocutor
who had lived in South Korea for twelve years. She continued:
Adults are respected. The food culture is really developed. People love each other; they go on
dates. There are childhood memories, beautiful married life … there is all of this, because
this is a world in which people live. But they don’t recognize it here [in South Korea].
And if you said this, they would call you a chongbuk.
In contemporary South Korean politics, the polarizing rhetoric of chongbuk (“North Korea
sympathizer”) is used to criticize anyone on the South Korean left and is commonly
invoked to attack domestic South Korean political opponents.76 T’albungmin fear the
label in an environment in which they already face discrimination for simply being
North Korean by birth, particularly those who fail to sufficiently distance themselves
from the DPRK. As one t’albungmin man we met said, the prominence of media stories
about North Korean defector-spies compelled him to demonstrate more overtly that he
was not a spy, which he did by criticizing North Korea and the country’s human rights
record more vocally than he would have done otherwise. In this way, the polarized
South Korean political landscape compels t’albungmin to participate in a set human
rights discourse or risk stigmatization as “North Korea sympathizers.”
The conditions that circumscribe the social inclusion of t’albungmin are grounded in
broader geopolitical and economic considerations, including North–South Korean
relations and those between the North Korean state and the wider international commu-
nity. Despite South Korea’s nationalistic claim of sovereignty over the entire peninsula,
North Koreans are only able to activate their right to South Korean citizenship if they
successfully reach the South of their own accord. North Koreans’ access to South
Korean citizenship is also conditional on passing a national security investigation
designed to prevent the entry of North Korean spies. Moreover, North Koreans who
meet the requirements to obtain South Korean citizenship are further divided into desir-
able and undesirable types. When t’albungmin articulate the feeling that they are second-
class citizens, they highlight tensions associated with socially incorporating people from
an enemy nation and reflect the international standing of the North Korean state as pro-
jected onto their own bodies.
76Doucette and Koo 2014.
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Being accepted in SouthKorea is thus contingent on t’albungminnegotiating and, if poss-
ible, overcoming their suspect status. One way in which t’albungmin do so and access the
social and material benefits outlined above is by submitting to certain conditions and
accepting invitations to speak publicly on circumscribed topics, in human rights forums,
churches, television programs, or as representatives of international organizations.
However, their participation reinforces the idea of “good” and “bad”North Koreans, effec-
tively silencing diverse t’albungmin voices andmaking it harder for others to integrate. The
irony is that, although the public narratives of t’albungminhighlight human rights’ abuses in
the North, the whole enterprise of these testimonies demonstrates restrictions on their
freedom of expression in South Korea. Not only is access to such public spaces restricted
to t’albungmin willing to talk about pre-determined topics, North Koreans directly
employed as public speakers by the South Korean government or government-affiliated
organizations are reportedly censored or silenced at times when North–South Korean
relations have improved.77 Moreover, South Korea’s conditional acceptance of North
Koreans is not a humanitarian act; instead it is an act of selective inclusion that furthers
its symbolic claim of sovereignty over all Korean people on the Korean Peninsula.
T’albungmin play a similar role internationally. A North Korean criticizing the North
Korean government at an international event supports foreign policy initiatives that call
for systematic reform in the DPRK. Individuals like Park Yeonmi present testimonies
which praise the freedoms offered by democratic capitalist systems and criticize the failures
ofNorthKorea. The narratives of t’albungminplay a role on an international stage alongside
state-level actors, whose motives are often hidden or underplayed. This case of conditional
inclusion thus highlights the need to look beyond national contexts and consider how
inclusion and exclusion at a national level play into wider international politics.
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